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I 
INTRODUCTION 
Although an ample body of literature has focused squarely on the efficiency 
implications of the web of regulations affecting health professionals and health 
insurers, the issue of the distributional effects of such regulations appears to 
have largely escaped the notice of scholars.  This article directly addresses the 
equity issue by offering some preliminary calculations of the magnitude of such 
burdens and the extent to which they contribute to the distributive injustices 
catalogued by Clark Havighurst and Barak Richman in this issue of Law and 
Contemporary Problems. 
The article begins with some general observations in Part II about how 
health spending is currently distributed and what implications this has for 
determining the distributional effects of health-services regulations, such as 
those aimed at health professionals and health plans.  Part III then focuses on 
the regulation of health professionals of all types;1 Part IV examines regulation 
of health facilities (predominantly hospitals and nursing homes); and Part V 
discusses regulation of health plans, including conventional health insurance as 
well as managed care plans.  Each section explores the extent to which the 
benefits and costs of such regulation may be distributed unevenly. 
This article concludes that the marginal impact of health regulation is to 
make the U.S. health system more, rather than less, regressive.  Though current 
evidence does not allow a precise estimate of the quantitative impact, it appears 
that the specific regulations contributing most to distributive injustice include 
continuation of coverage requirements, health insurance mandates, and 
regulation of managed care (for example, patient protection). 
 
Copyright © 2006 by Christopher J. Conover 
This article is also available at http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/lcp. 
 * Assistant Research Professor of Public Policy Studies, Center for Health Policy, Terry Sanford 
Institute of Public Policy, Duke University. 
 1. Of course, the reader must recognize that the lion’s share of literature in this area concentrates 
on physicians; hence our picture of the ramifications of regulation of mid-level providers or other types 
of health professionals may be somewhat less than complete. 
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II 
GENERAL OBSERVATIONS 
Previous work by John Holahan and Sheila Zedlewski has addressed the 
general question of who pays for health care in the United States.2  This 
pioneering study carefully tracked the byzantine system of health care spending3 
for the nonelderly by income decile, accounting for all the major sources of 
health care spending, including employer-paid health insurance premiums, 
worker-paid premiums, nongroup premiums, out-of-pocket spending, Medicaid, 
and uncompensated care.  It then separately tracked the distribution of 
financing those funding flows, detailing how each income group contributed to 
the financing of Medicaid, Medicare, and the employer tax exclusion.  Taking 
into account both direct payments (premiums and out-of-pocket spending) and 
tax payments, they found that individuals in the first income decile faced a 
health-spending burden amounting to 20.5% of their income, the second decile 
burden was 11.8%, and the tenth decile burden was 8.4%, as shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: 4 Health Care Spending as Percent of Income (1989) 
  1st Decile 2nd Decile 10th Decile Average 
Per Capita Income 1861 4328 34,525 14,311 
  Percent of Income 
Direct Payments 18.8% 9.5% 3.4% 6.1% 
Employer Premiums 2.1% 3.5% 2.5% 4.2% 
Value of Tax Exclusion -0.5% -0.9% -0.9% -1.5% 
Worker Premiums 0.5% 1.2% 0.5% 1.0% 
Non-group Premiums 3.2% 1.6% 0.2% 0.5% 
Out of Pocket 13.4% 4.2% 1.1% 1.9% 
Tax Payments 1.7% 2.3% 5.0% 4.7% 
Medicaid 0.0% 0.0% 1.1% 0.7% 
Medicare 1.2% 1.9% 2.7% 2.9% 
Employer Tax Exclusion 0.5% 0.5% 1.3% 1.1% 
Total 20.5% 11.8% 8.4% 10.9% 
 
 2. See generally John Holahan & Sheila Zedlewski, Who Pays for Health Care in the United 
States? Implications for Health Care Reform, 29 INQUIRY 2, 231–48 (1992) (examining health care 
spending distribution). 
 3. The data used in this study was collected in 1989.  Subsequently, the share of national health 
spending that is federally financed increased from 23% in 1987 to 37% by 2004, nearly all through 
higher spending from general revenues.  Cynthia Smith et al., National Health Spending in 2004: Recent 
Slowdown Led by Prescription Drug Spending, 25 HEALTH AFF. 186, 190 exhibit 4 (2006).  On balance, 
this would make today’s system somewhat more progressive than in 1989 but would not appreciably 
alter the general picture painted by these authors. 
 4. The information in Table 1 was calculated by the author based on expenditure data reported in 
Holahan & Zedlewski, supra note 2. 
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Health Spending 67.2% 24.2% 4.1% 8.5% 
 
This two-and-one-half-fold difference in burdens between the bottom and 
the top of the income-distribution curve confirms the general suspicions voiced 
by Havighurst and Richman about the regressive nature of America’s system of 
health care financing.5  However, two caveats are in order.  First, if each family 
actually had to fully bear the burden of its own health care expenditures, the 
first decile would be spending 67.2% of their income on health care, compared 
to only 4.1% for those in the tenth decile (Table 1); this admittedly is an 
unrealistic hypothetical insofar as the lowest-income group would surely 
massively defer, delay, or forego needed care altogether if faced with such a 
stark choice.  Nevertheless, it gives a feel for how much the current system—
even though it remains regressive in the aggregate—actually compresses the 
extent of this regressivity (that is, taking what would otherwise be a seventeen-
fold differential in the hypothetical just posed and compressing this to only a 
two-and-one-half-fold difference). 
Second, an analysis using 1987 Consumer Expenditure Survey data showed 
that the relative burden of food expenditures for poverty households compared 
to those at 400% or more of poverty was 4.6 to 1; for all nonfood, nondurable 
purchases, this ratio was 3.4 to 1; for shelter, it was 2.6 to 1, and for gasoline, it 
was 3.3 to 1.6  In that context, a two–and-one-half-fold differential in health 
spending burdens seems quite comparable to the differentials Americans 
tolerate with respect to spending on other necessities of life. 
To the degree that health-services regulation is simply baked into all health 
spending as an add-on to the cost of both or either health services and health 
insurance, then one would expect to see this two-and-one-half-fold differential 
in burdens played out if an attempt were made to estimate the incidence of 
regulatory costs by poverty status.  However, since no one proposes dispensing 
with regulation entirely, the more interesting policy question is whether the 
excess costs of regulation somehow are disproportionately funneled onto those 
with the lowest incomes.  Put another way, would the poor disproportionately 
benefit by removal of some of this regulatory excess?  Policymakers surely 
would like the answer to this question.  What follows is a first cut at answering 
it. 
III 
OVERREGULATING HEALTH PROFESSIONALS 
A recent literature synthesis conducted for the U.S. Department of Health 
and Human Services demonstrates that in the aggregate, various regulations 
 
 5. Clark C. Havighurst & Barak D. Richman, Distributive Injustice(s) in American Health Care, 69 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 8 (Autumn 2006). 
 6. Christopher J. Conover, unpublished analysis using 1987 Consumer Expenditure Survey data 
(July 25, 1991) (on file with author). 
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affecting health professionals imposed a cost of $29.5 billion annually, but 
conferred benefits whose value amounted to only $22.4 billion.7  Is the net 
burden of $7.1 billion regressively distributed?  The three largest contributors 
to this net cost include Medicare graduate medical education (GME) payments 
($4.3 billion), professional accreditation and licensure ($1.8 billion), and 
Medicare assignment rules ($1.2 billion).8 
A. Medicare GME Payments 
Medicare GME payments have been used to subsidize the costs of both 
direct medical education (DME) and indirect medical education (IME), such as 
the added costs of care attributable to medical residents.9  Since the Balanced 
Budget Act of 1997, there has been a cap on residency positions funded with 
Medicare GME dollars.10  In conjunction with licensure rules that basically 
preclude any physician from becoming licensed without having gone through 
residency training, the combination of these policies essentially regulates the 
future supply of physicians.  Medicare Part A finances GME payments, and the 
payroll tax used for this purpose is arguably regressive.11  On the other hand, 
care provided by medical residents is almost certainly skewed to the bottom end 
of the income scale,12 so if one sought to calculate the net burden of this domain 
of regulation, it more likely would be slightly progressive than regressive.13 
 
 7. CHRISTOPHER J. CONOVER, CATO INSTITUTE, POLICY ANALYSIS NO. 527, HEALTH CARE 
REGULATION: A $169 BILLION HIDDEN TAX 11 tbl.3 (2004), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/ 
pas/pa527.pdf.  Costs and benefits are reported in 2002 dollars.  This analysis was specifically conducted 
for the Assistant Secretary of Planning and Evaluation. 
 8. Id. 
 9. See Sean Nicholson & David Song, The Incentive Effects of the Medicare Indirect Medical 
Education Policy, 20 J. HEALTH ECON. 909, 910 (2001) (discussing the purpose and use of Medicare 
GME payments). 
 10. Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. 105-33, § 4623, 111 Stat. 251, 274 (1997). 
 11. Even though the payroll tax is now essentially a “flat tax” of 2.9% on all earnings, compared to 
those in the very highest income groups, low-income families rely far more heavily on such earnings, as 
opposed to other sources of income such as interest income, suggesting the net effect is slightly 
regressive.  See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., INDIVIDUAL COMPLETE REPORT (PUBLICATION 1304) 
tbl.1.4 (2003) (providing data on sources of income by size of adjusted gross income), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/indtaxstats/article/0,,id=96981,00.html#_grp1. 
 12. I am unaware of any specific study that tracks status the services provided by medical residents 
by patient income.  However, Hadley and Holahan argue that at least $1.6 billion of $3.7 billion in 
Medicare indirect medical education (IME) payments go to the uninsured.  Jack Hadley & John 
Holahan, How Much Medical Care Do the Uninsured Use, and Who Pays for It?, 2003 HEALTH AFF. 
(WEB EXCLUSIVE) W3-66, W3-73 to W3-74, 76 exhibit 4.  The uninsured disproportionately have low 
incomes.  See CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY, AND 
HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2004 18 tbl.7  
(2005) (providing data on insurance status by income), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2005 
pubs/p60-229.pdf. 
 13. In 1998, $5.9 billion in Medicare GME funding amounted to $76,540 per medical resident.  See 
Christopher J. Conover, unpublished calculation (Jan. 8, 2006) (on file with author) (based on figures 
outlined in Nicholson & Song, supra note 9, at 909).  In per capita terms, financing $5.9 billion in 1989 
would have increased payroll taxes for the lowest two income deciles by $1.35 and $10.82 per capita, 
respectively.  See Christopher J. Conover, unpublished calculations (Jan. 8, 2006) (on file with author) 
(based on data in Holahan & Zedlewski, supra note 2, at 240 tbl.6).  Put another way, these lowest two 
deciles accounted for only 2% of the entire burden of Medicare payroll taxes.  But it seems reasonable 
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B. Professional Accreditation and Licensure 
One of the studies of health-services regulation included in the literature 
synthesis was Reuben Kessel’s 1958 analysis of physician licensure, in which he 
argued that American Medical Association (AMA) regulation effectively 
created a monopoly that permitted physicians to earn higher-than-competitive 
returns on their investments in medical education.14  This argument was echoed 
by Elton Rayack in a book-length treatment of the issue a decade later.15  Even 
though the political power of the AMA has dissipated rather considerably since 
that period, the hours-adjusted rate of return to physicians in subsequent 
decades kept rising rather than stabilizing or falling, exceeding twenty percent 
for some specialties, as shown in Table 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
More recent data show no signs these excess returns have abated.  For 
example, despite a sharp slowdown in the 1990s due to the widespread adoption 
of managed care, the ratio of average net physician income to average earnings 
of full-time wage and salary workers in the United States remained the same in 
2000 (5.5) as it had been in 1985 (5.5).17  Thus, it would appear that American 
physicians continue to command supra-competitive returns on their investments 
in education. 
 
to assume these two groups got at least their pro rata share of free care provided by these residents—
20%—or likely considerably more.  Hence, the net effect is likely to push things in a progressive rather 
than a regressive direction. 
 14. Reuben Kessel, Price Discrimination in Medicine, 1 J.L. & ECON. 20, 29 (1958); see Reuben 
Kessel, The AMA and the Supply of Physicians, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 267, 272 (Spring 1970) 
(discussing the effect of regulation on educational costs and physicians’ fees). 
 15. See generally ELTON RAYACK, PROFESSIONAL POWER AND AMERICAN MEDICINE (1967). 
 16. Information in Table 2 is based on data reported in Charles Phelps, HEALTH ECONOMICS 176 
tbl.6.3 (1992). 
 17. See KAISER FAMILY FOUND., TRENDS AND INDICATORS IN THE CHANGING HEALTH CARE 
MARKETPLACE exhibit 6.4 (2002) (comparing mean income between physicians and full-time wage and 
salary workers in 1985, 1996, 1998, and 2000), http://www.kff.org/insurance/7031/print-sec6.cfm. 
Table 2: 16 Rising Rates of Return to Medical 
Specialization 
Year OB/GYN 
General 
Surgery 
Internal 
Medicine 
1955 6.7 5.7 <0 
1965 4.8 5.2 1.5 
1967 7.5 7.4 8.3 
1970 11.8 11.2 9.3 
1975 12.1 11.6 12.5 
1980 14.8 13.6 9.8 
1987 25.9 22.1 12.7 
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Yet a fair question is this:  supra-competitive returns relative to what?  It 
turns out that physicians are not the only profession in which supra-returns are 
available.  The most recent available comparative data show that procedure-
based, medical-doctor specialists have an hours-adjusted annual rate of return 
over their working lifetime of 20.9%, while that for dentists was 20.7%; even 
primary-care doctors had a return of 15.9%.18  In light of the average 
profitability for U.S. corporations (5.5%),19 these are impressive rates of return.  
The same study found that graduates of the top twenty business schools earned 
29.0% annually on their investment in education;20 nevertheless, this 
comparison may be flawed since it compares graduates of only elite business 
schools to graduates of all 114 U.S. medical schools.  Indeed, the study’s authors 
argue that “assuming that undergraduate grade point averages accurately 
predict relative performance in future careers, it may be more accurate to 
compare physicians with graduates of the top law schools.”21  Their analysis 
showed that law-school graduates enjoyed returns of 25.4%.22  Thus, it is not 
altogether clear whether the returns to physicians truly represent “excess” 
monopoly returns or are simply the returns required to prevent would-be 
doctors from instead entering the legal profession.  Ironically, these staggering 
returns are available to lawyers despite the conventional wisdom that the 
United States already has a sizable surplus of lawyers—a surplus that has been 
estimated to reduce economic output by more than $1 trillion annually.23 
But, assuming for the sake of argument that returns to physicians are 
excessive, three additional observations are worth noting.  First, it would be 
difficult to tease out what component of these inflated returns can be laid at the 
feet of regulation as opposed to the distortions created by the tax code in 
encouraging excessive third-party coverage.24  Second, to the extent to which 
regulation results in higher spending on physicians across the board, the result 
generally would be regressive insofar as average utilization of physicians is not 
strongly correlated with income, since any income-related propensity to spend 
on physician care is apparently largely offset by the availability of public 
 
 18. William B. Weeks et al., A Comparison of the Educational Costs and Incomes of Physicians and 
Other Professionals, 330 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1280, 1283 (1994). 
 19. Average earnings per dollar of sales for the period of October 2000 to September 2005 are 
based on American Petroleum Institute calculations from data reported in various issues of Business 
Week and by PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP.  Oil and Natural Gas Industry Earnings Compared to All 
U.S. Industry, ISSUE (Am. Petroleum Inst., Washington, D.C.), Winter 2006, at 1, available at http://api-
ep.api.org/filelibrary/ACF186.pdf. 
 20. Weeks, supra note 17, at 1284. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. James R. Garven, Moral Hazard, Adverse Selection, and Tort Liability, 28 J. INS. ISSUES 1, 9 
(2005). 
 24. Havighurst and Richman do a thorough job explaining the connection between the tax code 
and the increased demand for health care services and price insensitivity to those services.  Supra note 
5, at 36–39.  Because physicians are among many in the health industry who earn supra-competitive 
returns as a consequence of this price insensitivity, regulation simply aggravates an already regressive 
situation. 
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insurance and the generally worse health of the poor.25  Third, public insurance 
and physician-provided free care should largely mitigate the regressive impact 
this regulatory surcharge might otherwise have.26  AMA surveys show that two-
thirds of physicians provide uncompensated care, with such physicians 
averaging 8.8 hours per week (more than fourteen percent of their time).27  
Other independent surveys show the figure may be even higher;28 whatever the 
actual number is, it redounds disproportionately to the benefit of patients with 
the lowest incomes. 
IV 
OVERREGULATING HEALTH FACILITIES 
The literature synthesis demonstrates that in the aggregate, various 
regulations affecting health facilities imposed a cost of $47.7 billion annually, 
but conferred benefits whose value amounted to only $22.6 billion.29  The $25.1 
billion in net costs was accounted for largely through hospital accreditation and 
 
 25. The average number of annual physician visits in the U.S. declines as family income increases 
up until $50,000, after which it increases.  NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF 
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., HEALTH, UNITED STATES 287 tbl.74 (1998), available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus/hus98ncb.pdf.  However, controlling for health status, the number of 
acute, chronic, and well-care visits all increase with income.  Phelps, supra note 16, at 130 tbl.5.7. This 
demonstrates that the higher use of physician services at the lower end of the income scale is driven by 
low-income persons’ worse health status, and it is reasonable to infer that public insurance is an 
important factor in their being able to afford such higher use. 
 26. Among the nonelderly, 27.8% of those below 200% of poverty have Medicaid or state health 
insurance coverage, and another 32.6% are uninsured.  John Holahan & Allison Cook, Changes in 
Economic Conditions and Health Insurance Coverage, 2000-2004, 2005 HEALTH AFF. (WEB 
EXCLUSIVE) W5-498, W5-501 exhibit 2.  Average Medicaid spending per capita for those in families (as 
opposed to the elderly) was $2408 annually.  John Holahan & Arunabh Ghosh, Understanding the 
Recent Growth in Medicaid Spending, 2000-2003, 2005 HEALTH AFF. (WEB EXCLUSIVE) W5-52, W5-59 
exhibit 6.  In 2004, 45.8 million Americans were uninsured.  DeNavas-Walt, supra note 12, at 18 tbl.7.  
The uninsured received $40.7 billion in uncompensated care that year.  Jack Hadley & John Holahan, 
The Cost of Care for the Uninsured: What Do We Spend, Who Pays, and What Would Full Coverage 
Add to Medical Spending?, Presentation Prepared for the Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the 
Uninsured fig.5 (May 10, 2004) [hereinafter Hadley & Holahan, Presentation], 
http://www.kaisernetwork.org/health_cast/uploaded_files/Hadley_and_Holahan_Slides.pdf.  The 
average subsidized spending per uninsured in 2004 was nearly $900.  Christopher J. Conover, 
unpublished calculation (October 10, 2005) (on file with author) (based on data provided in DeNavas-
Walt, supra note 12, at 18 tbl.7, and Hadley & Holahan, Presentation, supra at fig.5).  Thus, averaged 
over the entire population of individuals below 200% of poverty, these subsidies amount to $959 per 
capita.  There is no plausible way for the regulatory costs related to physicians or other health 
professionals to exceed this amount. 
 27. CAROL KANE, AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, PHYSICIAN MARKETPLACE REPORT: 
PHYSICIAN PROVISION OF CHARITY CARE, 1988–1999 1 (2002), available at 
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/upload/mm/363/charity_care_2002.pdf. 
 28. For example, although their survey documents a decline in physician charity care, the 
Community Tracking Survey shows that in 2004–2005, 68.2% of physicians provided some charity care 
and averaged 10.6 hours per week on such activities.  Peter J. Cunningham & Jessica H. May, A 
Growing Hole in the Safety Net: Physician Charity Care Declines Again, TRACKING REP. NO. 13 (Ctr. 
for Studying Health Sys. Change, Washington, D.C.), Mar. 2006, at 2 tbl.1, available at 
http://www.hschange.com/CONTENT/826/826.pdf. 
 29. CONOVER, supra note 7, at 6 tbl.2. 
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licensure ($8.6 billion), hospital uncompensated-care pools ($5.2 billion), and 
the Clinical Laboratory Improvement Act (CLIA) of 198830 ($3.2 billion).31 
A. Hospital Accreditation and Licensure 
Whatever benefits of hospital quality regulation exist presumably redound 
to the benefit of all patients.  However, based on the well-established case from 
Medicare that the appetite for technology and services rises with income,32 if 
regulation improved overall hospital quality (a hornet’s-nest question avoided 
here), a case certainly can be made that regulation would disproportionately 
favor socioeconomically advantaged patients over those who are disadvantaged 
on grounds that such patients would be more willing to pay for such 
improvements.  If quality regulation or entry regulations (such as Certificate of 
Need on the hospital side) result in higher costs absorbed by all payers in the 
form of what amounts to an excise tax, such a tax would be undeniably 
regressive.  However, it turns out that this tax is not nearly as regressive as the 
pure head tax that Havighurst and Richman argue operates in the employer 
health-insurance market.33  That is, taking into account amounts they pay out of 
pocket as well as what they pay implicitly through private health insurance for 
such services, the burden on poor families is three to four times as high as it is 
for families at 400% of poverty or higher, as illustrated in Table 3.  In contrast, 
a head tax would result in more than an eight-fold difference in the relative 
burden faced by poor versus well-to-do families. 
 
Table 3: 34 Hospital Tax is Less Regressive Than a 
Head Tax 
Family Income 
as Percent of 
Poverty 
Lottery 
(head tax) 
Hospital 
Tax 
Physician 
Tax 
 
Average Burden per $10,000 Family 
Income35 
Uninsured 
Poor 930 174 192 
Below Poverty 930 338 313 
 
 30. 42 U.S.C. § 263a (2000). 
 31. Id. 
 32. See generally Mark McClellan & Jonathan Skinner, The Incidence of Medicare, 90 J. PUB. 
ECON. 257 (2006) (providing the most empirically grounded version of this thesis). 
 33. Havighurst & Richman, supra note 5, at 24. 
 34. CHRISTOPHER J. CONOVER & HESTER HAVERKAMP DAVIES, DUKE UNIVERSITY CENTER 
FOR HEALTH POLICY, LAW AND MANAGEMENT, HEALTH CARE FOR THE MEDICALLY INDIGENT OF 
SOUTH CAROLINA: FINAL REPORT (1998), available at http://www.hpolicy.duke.edu/cyberexchange/ 
states/pdf/CHAPTER1.PDF. 
 35. Figures account for all out-of-pocket spending and private-health-insurance premiums but 
exclude incidence of financing Medicaid, Medicare, or other public programs. 
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101-150% 543 283 312 
151-200% 401 231 242 
201-299% 298 193 187 
300-399% 210 133 136 
400% + 110 76 105 
 
B. Hospital Uncompensated Care Pools 
Analyzing hospital uncompensated-care pools is more complicated since in 
this case the benefits of such pools are tilted unquestionably in favor of those at 
the bottom.  Thus, even if the gross costs of such pools are financed in the 
fashion shown in Table 2, at best this would represent a small offset to the per 
capita benefits of such pools for the poor as a group.  Therefore, in terms of net 
burden, this particular regulation seems unlikely to be regressively distributed, 
although it is unquestionably more regressively distributed than if the “hidden 
tax” of hospital cost-shifting were more neutrally borne.  That said, not every 
poor person utilizes hospital care in a year.  (Among those with family incomes 
below $15,000, fewer than one in seven experience a hospitalization in a typical 
year).36  Thus, most with low incomes would experience a disproportionate 
burden of financing uncompensated-care pools similar to that already described 
for hospital accreditation and licensure. 
C. Clinical Laboratory Improvement Act (CLIA)37 
Although clinical laboratories themselves are facilities, any burdens of 
regulation are ultimately borne by users of hospitals, nursing homes, and 
outpatient health services.  Hospital laboratories account for fewer than half of 
all clinical laboratories.38  In a typical hospital, there is a higher mark-up on 
ancillary services than on routine services such as per diem charges.39  Thus, 
there is greater opportunity to discount pricing on laboratory services than on 
other parts of a hospital bill.  Although things are now beginning to change in 
 
 36. NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, supra note 25, at 302 tbl.87. 
 37. 42 U.S.C. § 263a (2000).  CLIA imposes uniform federal regulations designed to ensure a 
minimal level of quality in clinical laboratories regardless of location; thus, CLIA covers not only 
freestanding labs to which hospitals or physicians may send blood or other biological specimens for 
testing, but also labs located in hospitals and physician offices.  Even if quality regulation increases the 
cost of lab tests by an equal percentage in all locations, for example 5%, the distributional 
consequences may differ slightly based on how these higher costs are passed through to patients (which 
in turn will depend on their payer status). 
 38. John T. Benjamin, The Effect of CLIA ‘88 and Managed Care on the Medical Lab Market, 
MED. LABORATORY OBSERVER, Nov. 1996, at 54. 
 39. Barbara O. Wynn, Senior Health Policy Analyst, RAND, Inflation in Hospital Charges: 
Implications for the California Workers’ Compensation Program, Testimony Presented to the 
California Senate Labor and Industrial Relations Committee 2 (Jan. 15, 2003), available at 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/2005/CT202.pdf. 
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light of recent media attention to the high prices paid by uninsured patients,40 on 
average, any regressivity in the burden of financing hospital care in general 
(Table 3) is likely to be even more exaggerated for hospital-provided lab 
services.  That is, any pass-through of laboratory regulatory costs is likely to be 
amplified by the higher-than-average mark-ups used for such services. 
Physician labs constitute approximately one in seven clinical laboratories.41  
But as shown in Table 3, the distributional consequences of passing such costs 
through physician services are nearly identical to the distributional effects of an 
add-on to hospital service costs.  That is, they are regressive. 
V 
OVERREGULATING HEALTH PLANS 
The literature synthesis demonstrates that in the aggregate, various 
regulations affecting health insurance imposed a cost of $99.3 billion annually 
but conferred benefits whose value amounted to only $84.9 billion.42  The $14.4 
billion in net costs was accounted for largely through continuation of coverage 
requirements ($15.0 billion), benefits mandates ($13.5 billion), and managed-
care patient-protection regulations ($3.2 billion).43 
A. Continuation of Coverage Requirements 
Probably the best-known continuation of coverage requirement is the 
Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA) of 1985,44 which 
requires employers with twenty or more employees that provide group health 
insurance to provide employees and their families continued coverage if certain 
events occur, such as loss of the employee’s job, the death of a covered 
employee, or divorce.45  Because employers are permitted to charge employees 
who take advantage of this continuation coverage a premium not to exceed 
102% of the full premium for the cost of that plan,46 only one in six eligible 
workers finds it worthwhile to purchase this coverage.47  Not surprisingly, those 
electing to purchase the coverage have medical costs that exceed the (capped) 
 
 40. See Conrad Meier, Hospitals Face Pressure to Change Pricing Policies, HEALTH CARE NEWS 
(Council for Affordable Health Ins., Alexandria, V.A.), Apr. 1, 2004 (noting potential changes in 
response to recent news articles), http://www.cahi.org/article.asp?id=137. 
 41. Benjamin, supra note 38. 
 42. CONOVER, supra note 7, at 12 tbl.4. 
 43. Id.  These three categories of regulation together greatly exceed the net cost of health-
insurance regulation because certain insurance regulations have net benefits (for example, health-
provider mandates have a net cost of -$12.2 billion) that offset net costs incurred in other areas of 
health-insurance regulation.  Id. 
 44. 31 U.S.C. § 6701 (2000). 
 45. See Brigitte C. Madrian, Health Insurance Portability: The Consequences of COBRA, 
REGULATION, Winter 1998, at 27, 27–33 (more details about COBRA). 
 46. Id. at 27. 
 47. CHARLES D. SPENCER & ASSOCIATES INC., 2002 COBRA SURVEY (2002), reprinted in part in 
MEDICAL BENEFITS, Oct. 15, 2002, at 5, 6 tbl.2 (showing 16.2% of eligible employees elected COBRA 
coverage in 2002). 
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premiums they are required to pay, resulting in a net subsidy that amounted to 
$2491 per COBRA-covered individual in 2002.48 
Thus, these regulations are doubly regressive:  their benefits accrue 
disproportionately to employees with high enough incomes to be able to afford 
to pay full freight for their coverage.  The costs of financing these subsidized 
benefits are presumably allocated back to the general pool of employees.  If this 
is financed through the equivalent of a head tax (that is, equal premiums per 
employee), the result is regressive; if employee contributions are fully adjusted 
for in lower wages based on individual employees’ willingness to pay, then the 
effect of financing this benefit is neutral, but the benefits would continue to be 
regressively distributed, with the lion’s share going to the most well-off workers. 
B. Benefits Mandates 
Benefits mandates include minimum maternity stays following delivery, 
mandatory breast-reconstruction surgery, mental-health parity requirements, 
and similar requirements.  There are a handful of federally imposed mandates, 
including the first two listed in this paragraph,49 but the majority consist of the 
more than fifty different benefits mandates that states have enacted during the 
past half-century.50  It is certainly beyond the scope of this article to individually 
analyze all these various mandates, but the federal mandates are probably 
indicative of the types of political pressures that have led to the adoption of 
various mandates.  If patients were given a choice between the mandated 
benefit and a payment equivalent to the additional cost to the system, it is a 
reasonable presumption that low-income patients would be on average more 
likely than higher-income patients to accept the payment in lieu of the 
“benefit.” 
So, as with the continuation of coverage requirements, benefits mandates 
again appear to reflect a situation in which net benefits disproportionately 
redound to those with high incomes—that is, the amount that high incomes are 
“taxed” via the health plan to finance such benefits appears to be lower than 
their willingness to pay for such benefits, with the opposite being true for low-
wage workers.  Even if we believe that health benefits in general are financed 
through a hidden wage adjustment that fully compensates for the individual 
worker’s willingness to pay for that benefit, it is difficult to imagine this 
adjustment working in the case of many mandated benefits.  Admittedly, 
Jonathan Gruber found nearly full downward adjustment of wages for women 
of child-bearing ages to offset the costs of maternity benefits,51 but it is difficult 
 
 48. Id. at 5. 
 49. GAIL A. JENSEN & MICHAEL A. MORRISEY, HEATLH INS. ASS’N OF AM., MANDATED 
BENEFIT LAWS AND EMPLOYER-SPONSORED HEALTH INSURANCE, 5 (1999). 
 50. See VICTORIA CRAIG BUNCE, COUNCIL FOR AFFORDABLE HEALTH INS., HEALTH 
INSURANCE MANDATES IN THE STATES 2004 4–5 (2004) (listing benefits mandates by state), 
http://www.cahi.org/cahi_contents/resources/pdf/Mandatepub2004Electronic.pdf. 
 51. Jonathan Gruber, The Incidence of Mandated Maternity Benefits, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 622, 630–
31 (1994). 
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to see how a similar adjustment would apply to benefits whose likelihood of 
being used for any given employee might be microscopic.  Thus, for most 
employees, mandated benefits would appear to mirror the impacts described 
earlier for continuation of coverage. 
C. Managed Care Patient Protection 
Managed care patient protections include “any-willing-provider laws,” 
which require managed care organizations to accept any providers willing to 
accept the plan’s terms; external review requirements that create a review 
process for coverage denials that is independent of the health plan itself; and 
patient-protection laws that hold health-maintenance organizations (HMOs) 
liable for denial of coverage decisions.52  There is ample empirical evidence that 
such regulation has had the net effect of increasing the cost of managed-care 
plans.53  Evidence from Medicare suggests that those with the lowest and highest 
incomes are least likely to enroll in HMOs.54  But like any excise tax, any across-
the-board increase in managed care premiums resulting from such regulations 
would have a regressive effect since the add-on to premiums would represent a 
much larger share of income for those at the bottom of the income distribution 
than at the top.  Moreover, to the extent that such protections confer 
procedural protections, they are far more likely to be taken advantage of by 
better-educated, higher-income plan members than by those with the least 
education and income.  So again, we have a situation in which benefits are 
skewed to the advantage of the well-to-do, and the burden of financing ends up 
being borne regressively. 
VI 
CONCLUSION 
Far more research undoubtedly can and should be done on the 
distributional effects of the regulation of health professionals, health facilities, 
and health insurance.  But this brief excursion has largely supported the general 
thesis proposed by Havighurst and Richman.55  Even though the health-
financing system compresses rather remarkably the regressivity in financing that 
would otherwise be observed, the net burden of financing remains regressive in 
the aggregate.  And when one examines the marginal impact of health 
regulation on that broader picture, one could argue that the net effect on 
balance is to make the system more, rather than less, regressive overall.  In 
cases in which the regressive effect of regulation is mitigated, this generally 
 
 52. See Frank A. Sloan & Mark A. Hall, Market Failures and the Evolution of State Managed Care, 
65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 169, 187–89 tbl.2 (Autumn 2002) (listing such laws). 
 53. CONOVER, supra note 7, at 14. 
 54. COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, U.S. CONGRESS.  MEDICARE AND HEALTH CARE 
CHARTBOOK 200 fig.4.20 (1997), available at http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house/ways-and-
means/sec4.pdf. 
 55. Havighurst & Richman, supra note 5, at 8. 
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results from other aspects of policy (for example, public insurance) or the 
behavior of providers (for example, charity care), rather than the requirements 
of regulation itself.  A good example of this is the impact of professional 
licensure, which raises costs for all (which alone has a regressive impact) but 
whose costs may be partially or fully offset (at least for some lucky low-income 
patients) by programs such as Medicaid and charity care. 
In many domains of regulation, a similar pattern emerges in which the 
benefits of regulation were likely distributed in a fashion skewed towards those 
with higher incomes and in which financing the added costs of regulation was at 
best neutrally, but in many cases regressively, borne.  This analysis has focused 
on impacts purely from the standpoint of patients, that is, the “demand side.”  If 
the equation factors in the fact that much regulation results in higher incomes 
for those in the health field and ancillary professions such as health lawyers, 
then the regressive impact would be even worse than that described here.  
Others may calculate more precisely what the net incidence of health-services 
regulation might be, but I believe the picture painted herein provides a 
reasonable approximation of what those more precise calculations will likely 
find:  a net impact of health services regulation that is regressively distributed. 
